public health programmes in the different European countries. Although this paper focuses on the English experience of cholera after 1850, and on the development by the English health authorities of a system for excluding the disease from the country, this local history has a more than local significance.6 As a public health problem, cholera was recognized to be of international dimensions by 1850, and, in the search for a coherent international preventive policy in the decades after 1850, the cholera experience of England was to prove crucial.
The last English cholera epidemic occurred in 1866, after which England was singularly successful in excluding the disease. The traditional European response to invading infections was quarantine: cholera and the English example between them ended that tradition. Quarantines were a marked feature of government responses to the first and second pandemics; yet they transparently failed to prevent outbreaks of cholera, and were often abandoned.7 It was this failure that stimulated the first attempts to achieve an international policy for limiting the disease. The first International Sanitary Conference was convened at Paris in 1851 to examine Europe's position in respect of cholera, and to try to establish an international consensus on enforcing broadly uniform precautionary measures.8 It was the first of a series of such conferences, most of which foundered on the issue of trade, quarantine and international shipping. The majority of European countries continued to favour quarantine as the means of preventing the entry of sea-borne cholera, but Britain was adamantly opposed to any restriction on the freedom of trade. While medical men and diplomats struggled to reach agreement at repeated international conferences-at Constantinople in 1865, Vienna in 1874, Rome in 1885-the English preventive authorities evolved and perfected a system of sanitary surveillance coupled with detailed preventive measures (isolation and disinfection), which appeared to meet the challenge of imported cholera effectively. The British success in avoiding epidemic cholera after 1870, together with increasing familiarity with the causes and movements of the disease, were influential in changing attitudes among European observers. At the Conference of Venice (1892) and Dresden (1893) , the value of the English system was finally acknowledged, and its techniques adopted as the basis of international preventive action.9
Britain's position as an island nation extensively involved in international trade was a crucial determinant in the development of her cholera exclusion policy. Politically and economically committed to freedom of trade, the country had to devise measures other than quarantine for the exclusion of imported infectious disease.'0 The absence of epidemic cholera from the country in the decades after 1870 has often been attributed to sanitary 6 This account of preventive approach to cholera as an invader complements and extends my discussion of the preventive authorities' contribution to controlling the indigenous infectious diseases: Anne Hardy, The epidemic streets: infectious disease and the rise of preventive medicine, 1856-1900, Oxford University Press, in press. 7 improvement;" indeed, Michael Durey has convincingly argued that the "ideal" conditions for the spread of cholera within the community had begun to disappear soon after the outbreak of 1847-48.12 While there is no doubt that improving sanitary conditions and water supplies made a large contribution to England's freedom from cholera, the number of imported cases after 1870, and the persistence of waterborne typhoid in various parts of the country into the 1890s, indicate that possibilities for the epidemic extension of cholera continued to exist. Closer examination of the circumstances of the European cholera visitations after 1866, and of the development of English sanitary legislation, suggests that good fortune and an alert public health organization played a significant part in Britain's virtual freedom from cholera.
CHOLERA OBSERVED
The mid-Victorian public health organization was empirical in its methods, and observation of the broad epidemiological behaviour ofcholera, as revealed by its patterns of dissemination across Europe, was central to the development of England's defences against the disease. Already by the 1850s, the European manifestations of cholera were being studied with interest by English sanitarians trying to predict the likely assaults of the disease on their own country. The Growing familiarity with the behaviour of cholera bred little immediate complacency, however. More than any other decade, the 1850s were haunted by the disease. The epidemic of 1853-4, following so close upon the heels of that of 1848-9, awoke fears that the disease might become indigenous, or at least that the intervals between epidemics would shorten still further. ' By contrast with the 1850s, the explosion of pandemic cholera in the 1860s was met by an established sanitary organization, with nearly ten years of work behind it. In those years, considerable improvements had been effected in both the environment and public health organization of London and other large cities: in 1864, the Registrar-General thought the great towns in a far better condition than ever before to encounter cholera. And finally, the 1866 epidemic increased the confidence of the medical community in their own ability, through sanitary improvement and rigorous sanitary supervision, to limit outbreaks of the disease where it was not transmitted through water. It was, however, the attention paid to quality of water supplies and the regulation of shipping in the years after 1866 that led to the country's virtual freedom from cholera in the last three decades of the century. Doubts and difficulties continued, however, to surround issues of water purity before the twentieth century.33 This meant that the first element in the country's defences against cholera was her shoreline, the point of entry for the disease. Uncertain of the exact relationship between water and the transmission of cholera, and also of the exact efficiency of existing methods of water purification, English resistance to cholera after 1870 concentrated on safeguarding against the importation of cases. In this respect, the experience of 1866 was critical: it resulted in the refocusing of the English preventive effort. Cholera was no longer viewed as a local problem, but as one which must be met by a broadly based preventive scheme which took account of its status as invader, and of its means of international transmission.
PORT SANITARY AUTHORITIES
The cardinal importance of preventing the entry of dangerous communicable diseases into the country was recognized by the creation of a whole new division to the country's preventive organization, the Port Sanitary Authorities. For commercial and political reasons, the introduction of quarantine for shipping was out of the question.34 The experience of 1866, however, convinced the medical community that some form of control on the entry of vessels from areas known to be affected by communicable diseases was an The Public Health Act, 1875, made possible the compulsory removal to hospital of every patient suffering from an infectious disease on shipboard, and enabled the port sanitary authorities, with the approval of the Local Government Board, to make regulations for the compulsory notification and isolation of infectious cases. With respect to disinfection, ships and vessels in harbour were subject to the jurisdiction of the sanitary authority, in the way that houses were in mainland sanitary districts. Within a decade or so, however, it became apparent that ships' captains and crews were evading the regulations, because they resented the interference with their business and their liberty which sanitary regulation represented: a more precise definition of the port authorities' powers was clearly required. In 1885, therefore, the Public Health (Shipping) Act explicitly extended the powers granted to mainland local authorities in 1875 in respect of infectious disease to the port authorities. These provisions enabled port MOHs to cleanse and disinfect where they considered it necessary to check the spread of infectious disease; to destroy infected bedding, etc.; and to remove those without proper lodging or accommodation who were suffering from dangerous infectious disease to hospital. Port sanitary authorities could make regulations for the removal to hospital of infected persons brought in by ships; and might impose a penalty for the exposure of infected persons and articles, and for the letting of lodgings in houses where infectious disease existed. They were empowered to provide hospitals; to recover the cost of hospital maintenance from patients; and to provide a gratuitous temporary supply of medicine and medical attendance for poor persons in their districts.52
The sphere of the port sanitary authorities' interest extended widely beyond their own port limits, and contributed significantly to the overall success of the system. Apart from such indications of foreign epidemics as were obtainable from the Registrar-General's reports,53 careful attention was paid to the disease condition of ports of contact both at home and abroad. While something may be gleaned of the extent of such monitoring from various sources, Henry Armstrong, the very able Medical Officer of Health for Tyneside, left a description of the activities of his department which probably reflects the practices current in the great ports in the latter decades of the century. On Tyneside, extensive use was made of the available printed sources of information. The medical and daily press, the Shipping Gazette, and other journals were examined daily for reports of disease abroad. A list of vessels bound for the Tyne from infected ports was kept, in which were entered the name of the ship, the date of her passing different ports on her voyage, and the expected date of her arrival. Ships on this register were visited without delay by sanitary officers on arrival. The sanitary officers routinely interrogated the captains of all vessels boarded for information of infectious disease in their port of origin.54 It was this type of informationseeking, systematic monitoring and determined sifting of individual reports that constituted the country's most effective barrier against the import and dissemination of dangerous infectious diseases in the years after 1885.
Early experience proved the need for such diligence. In his first six months as port MOH, Harry Leach discovered "pretty exactly" the quarters from which cholera might be expected. Leach quickly became aware that London was being made a port of call for large emigrant ships carrying parties of between 100 and 300 persons, which were hauled into dock and remained two or three nights in the port. These vessels and their freight often came from continental ports infected, or suspected of infection, with cholera. In July, for example, the steamship Iris The failure of cholera to challenge English defences seriously in these years, as in 1857-9, lay only partly in the English preventive system. It was probably important that no sustained epidemic wave of the disease reached Europe, and it was certainly significant that it did not reach the Baltic ports. The challenge of imported cholera during the 1880s, as shown by the importations into the Port of London, was never very great (Table 1) .
The 1890s were, however, a very different matter. Between 1892 and 1897, 118 cases were brought into the Port of London, of which 58 were introduced in 1895 (Table 1) .73
The final great European pandemic of cholera began in the spring of 1892. Two centres of infection were soon identified: Paris, where the disease broke out in April 1892, and notably London, River Tyne, Hull and Goole, Southampton, Weymouth, Plymouth, Bristol, Cardiff, Bury-and-Cadoxton, Swansea and Liverpool, the medical inspection arrangements were not only highly satisfactory, but were carried out by the MOHs with such devotion to duty, that the Inspectors concluded they must have "largely contributed to the marked success with which imported cholera was controlled at nearly all English ports during 1892 and 1893".83 In 1893, cholera appeared in 62 localities, of which 15 were metropolitan sanitary districts. There were 287 cases and 135 deaths; but in 42 districts only single cases were known. These included 14 of the metropolitan districts. In only one metropolitan district was there more than 3 cases, and in only five districts overall was there a loss of more than 10 persons.84
Britain's freedom from epidemic cholera after 1866 had produced in many quarters the confident belief that such epidemics were a thing of the past.85 Although the Medical Department and local sanitary officers exercised extra vigilance and diligence in precautionary arrangements during each fresh European crisis,86 England's limited experience of cholera between 1867 and 1892 encouraged public complacency. During these years, generations grew up who had no personal experience of cholera epidemics, yet were aware of the disease as a constant threat abroad. As a result, the 1890s witnessed a marked discrepancy of emphasis between preventive action and public reaction to the threat of a cholera invasion.
The difference in public response to cholera between 1866 and 1892 reflects the growth of confidence in the sanitary service, as well as a wider public interest in sanitary matters. There was a far greater response in anticipation of cholera in 1892 than there had been in 1866. In 1866, cholera was no longer a novelty; its coming was beginning to be seen as a cyclical event; and in that year also the previous eruption of rinderpest-the cattle plague whose progress across Europe had been scrupulously followed by the Medical Department-absorbed public attention and distracted anxieties about cholera.87 At this time, too, the Medical Department was privileged in its sources of information and in its interest in European sanitary matters. Before the major outbreak of cholera in England in early July, the progress of the disease abroad had only been sparsely reported in the public press.88 English interest in cholera in 1866 was essentially insular in character. The intellectual effects of advancing technology are very evident in the contrasting cholera reportage of 1866 and 1892-3: the development of the telephone and the telegraph, the extension of railway networks in Europe, and the emergence of passenger steamship fleets, had revolutionized journalistic perspectives. By 1892, The Times, for example, carried lengthy and detailed reports from its special correspondents on cholera in Hamburg and Russia, while notices of the progress of the disease in distant parts of the world studded its pages. Readers of The Times would have been hard pressed to maintain an ignorance of European cholera and the threat to England in 1892.
1-3 Ibid. 84 The districts concerned were Grimsby (127 deaths), Hull (17), Ashbourne, Derbyshire (15), Cleethorpes (I 1), and Clacton, Essex (I 1). Journalistic interest in the prospect of cholera in 1892 seems to have generated a greater public awareness of that prospect than in 1866, among the educated classes at least. Nor can it be doubted that the activities of the preventive authorities contributed to this awareness: already in the summer of 1892, they were taking "infinite pains" to make their work efficient.89 Yet the zeal of the sanitary authorities in this respect may also have been counter-productive. Although there was no indication of any "epidemic tension" or panic over the threat of cholera,90 there were those who considered that this might be the result of the sanitary authorities' energetic reaction. On 5 September 1892, The Times carried a letter which sought to remind the general public that "the greatest ally of cholera is fear". The writer pointed to the differences in scale between epidemic cholera in the East-a death-rate of 559 per 10,000 at Damietta in 1883-and in England: death-rates of 30, 11 and 7 per 200,000 in the "epidemics" of 1849, 1854 and 1866. He thought it not unreasonable to assume that if cholera reached England that year, mortality would be less than in 1866, and recommended going about one's own business, "in the ordinary way":
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This I venture, with some experience to say is a safer course than being frightened into exceptional precautions, preventives, and remedies.9' Nonetheless, cholera provoked an extensive reaction in 1892. The Times leader of 5 September, while applauding the "foresight, zeal and activity" of the sanitary authorities, elaborated the argument by pointing out that sanitary offenders were a relatively small proportion of the community. In a passage remarkable for its unscientific logic, the paper urged the authorities to temper zeal with discretion, to take pains to do good, but only by stealth.
The class ... likely to grow nervous under the steady shower of warnings and exhortations now being poured out upon them is considerable, and the importance of the fact is manifest when it is remembered that fear ... is the most potent ally of epidemic cholera . . . Provident fear in their [the authorities'] breasts may be the mother of safety, but should it spread to those under their charge it can only sap the spirit of the garrison and make things easy for the enemy.92
Behind these remonstrations may be detected a whole spectrum of social and economic fears; no longer that cholera itself should damage the established order and prosperity of the country, but that the anticipation of cholera should do so.
It was evidently a potent anxiety. By the following spring when the sanitarians were fully expecting a major outbreak of the disease, Arthur Shadwell, The Times correspondent in Germany and Russia the previous year, complained irritably of the attitude of the press, which was encouraging the widespread popular belief that cholera was always more or less present on the Continent, and that the outbreaks at Hamburg and Paris presented no greater danger than those successfully encountered on many previous occasions, "with the laudable but superfluous intention of allaying an alarm which does not exist".93 Twenty-seven years of immunity from epidemic cholera had done their work: for most Englishmen, it seems, its continued existence on the Continent was a further illustration, if need be, of superior English standards of hygiene, and generally greater degree of civilization.
For informed sanitarians, however, the public optimism of 1892 was misplaced; with cholera at Hamburg, the danger to England must be considered grave. Arguments in favour of quarantine were again, rehearsed.94 The Medical Department deployed Dr Barry to monitor the diffusion of cholera through Europe, and by the late summer of 1892 was issuing precautionary advice.95 New measures were taken to control the passage of emigrants from the Baltic, and a Cholera Order was issued on 6 September.96 Meanwhile, the Lancet, manifesting almost hysterical alarm, lauded the new controls on the passage of emigrant Russian Jews, and urged extensive attention to preventive measures.97 The Metropolitan Asylums Board hastily appointed Arthur Shadwell to supervise emergency arrangements in case of an epidemic in London, while the city's local authorities and medical officers rehearsed their cholera provisions and prepared stocks of posters.98
Similarly extensive precautionary arrangements had been made in 1884,)9 but Shadwell considered in retrospect that the country had never been exposed to such danger from cholera since 1866. 1°°I t is plain that neither in 1884 nor in 1892-3 were the preventive authorities taking any risks. In both these pandemics elaborate arrangements were made to deal with any outbreak of cholera in London, and the preparations in London in 1892, in particular, highlighted the similarities and contrasts in the approach of professionals and public to the prospects of a cholera epidemic. There was no panic, but whereas the public health authorities took the epidemic threat seriously, and prepared accordingly, public attention was not seriously engaged. Indeed, a whole chaotic, preventively anarchistic spectrum of popular preoccupations and beliefs was ranged against the professional cohesion of the preventive services. While the newspapers were anxiously peddling the calming view that the country was in no real danger of cholera, very real fears were evidently entertained by some sectors of the population.'0' These were fuelled by the reported handful of cases, Britain was in many respects fortunate to escape cholera in 1892-3. Vigilant and well-prepared sanitary authorities might nonetheless have been hard-pressed by any concerted assault of the disease. Symptomless carriers of cholera were a factor which no preventive action could hope to counter on any significant scale, while the dangers associated with the freedom of travel through the Channel passenger ports was well recognized.'06The outbreak at Grimsby and Cleethorpes in August 1893, in which 127 people died, and from where cases were traced to twenty-six towns in the Midlands and the North, from Gloucester and Hereford in the west to Newcastle-upon-Tyne, gave Countries, France and elsewhere in Germany. The first imported cases arrived on Tyneside from Nantes as early as 25 June; the infection at Grimsby, which had begun in early August, was traced to Antwerp.'4 Once again, these ports were at a sufficient distance to facilitate the detection of cases, except, as the case of Grimsby proved, where the city and port sanitary authorities were inexcusably negligent. The outbreak at Grimsby, and its minor consequences, are evidence of the effectiveness of the wider sanitary organization, for there was no diffusion of the disease in the twenty-six towns to which the infection was carried from Grimsby and Cleethorpes. It may be, nonetheless, that England was once again protected from a more severe onslaught of cholera by the climatic factor. The summer of 1893 was one of those dry, hot summers that characterized the 1 890s, and which was probably inimical to the prolonged survival and disseminative properties of cholera. As Arthur Shadwell pointed out, the wide geographical spread of cholera in Europe during 1893 was accompanied by a comparatively low mortality, and although increased knowledge and improved sanitary conditions might have had some part to play in this, it was hard not to think that the exceptionally dry season had more to do with it. 1 15 In England, for example, the greatest diffusion of the disease, and nearly all the cases, occurred north of a line from the Wash to the Severn, in that part of the country least affected by the drought.' 16 The incursions of 1893 represented the last extension of cholera into the English mainland. In 1894 the disease was severely epidemic in Russia, and Germany, Belgium, Holland, Hungary and Turkey were also affected. In France, however, cholera was on the retreat, and by 1895 it was waning in Russia, and had retreated still further from Western Europe, into Galicia, Turkey, Egypt and Morocco. It was not without its old pandemic powers, however, for when in February 1896 Russia was finally declared free of cholera, a severe visitation was beginning to make itself felt in Egypt. '1 7 Past experience had by now so reinforced the confidence of the British public health authorities in their preventive system and in the modified danger which cholera in the Near East presented, that the Egyptian outbreak raised little concern. By 1898, cholera had disappeared from the list of the Medical Department's current anxieties, to be replaced by bubonic plague."18
If the larger movements of cholera were to some extent determined by the vagaries of season and climate, there is no doubt that sanitary circumstances and personal habits of cleanliness were major elements assisting its spread and influencing the locality of epidemic outbreaks. Recognition of these two sets of factors, within the constraint of a national maritime policy of freedom of trade, and in association with an internal preventive policy of detailed isolation for infectious disease, formed the basis of the English defence against cholera in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. Through the medium of the International Sanitary Conferences, and later of the International Conferences on Hygiene and Demography, the premises of English policy were given wide publicity on the European Continent, and came to be generally accepted with respect to the limitation of cholera dissemination by shipping in the last years of the century.' 9 Britain's sanitary surveillance of international shipping comprised the final plank in a national preventive system which was widely admired by contemporaries-it was, the Finn Alfred Palmberg noted, the most complete and precise in the civilized world-and Britain's success at excluding cholera after 1866, like her falling death-rates from tuberculosis, was regarded as proof of the superiority of that system.'20 While circumstances and good fortune certainly played their part in preserving England from epidemic cholera in the last three decades of the century, the systematic development of her sanitary defences, and the policies of a forward-looking central medical department supported by a dedicated local preventive network, appear to have been critical in holding repeated cholera attacks at bay. The of these apparent threats in 1892-3 was partly the result of improved domestic sanitary conditions, but was also based on confidence bred of past experience, on an improved understanding of the means by which the disease was transmitted and on broad popular ignorance of its epidemiological behaviour. It was those who remembered the epidemic of 1866 who were aware of the dangers of indifference, and who knew, as did Ernest Hart, that epidemic cholera was a disease which "struck down masses of the population in limited localities", that still feared its import in 1892. 121 If the mystery of cholera had been exploded by the end of the nineteenth century, familiarity with its causes and conditions did not enable the preventive establishment to view its entry into the country with equanimity.
